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NOTES AND COMMENTS
The Denaturalization and Deportation of
Nazi Criminals: Is It Constitutional?
I. INTRODUCTION
On June 22, 1941, Adolf Hitler launched an invasion of the So-
viet Union.1 Under the plan for this attack, known as Operation Bar-
barossa, Russia was to become an eastern annex of the German
Reich, helping to consolidate Hitler's plan of a master Aryan race. 2
Consequently, Operation Barbarossa had two objectives, the military
conquest of the Soviet Union and the extermination of Soviet Jews.3
The group whose responsibility it was to effectuate the elimination of
the Jews in Russia were mobile killing units of SS troops called
Einsatzgruppen.
4
In carrying out Operation Barbarossa, Hitler and his army set
out to conquer the Baltic countries of Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia.5
In Latvia, the Einsatzgruppen formed the locals into the Arjs Kom-
mando whose only purpose was to kill all the Jews of Latvia.6 In
1942, an Einsatzgruppe A report to Berlin stated, "'The number of
Jews in Latvia in 1935 was 93,479-4.79 percent of the entire popula-
tion .... At the present time there are only a few Jews in the ghettos
who are doing specialized work .... Aside from these Jews, Latvia
has become free of Jews in the meantime.' ,,7 In Lithuania, the locals
killed 500 Jews a day.8 In January, 1942, another Einsatzgruppe re-
port stated, " '.. . [iun Lithuania, the country and the smaller towns
1. A. RYAN, QUIET NEIGHBORS: PROSECUTING NAZI WAR CRIMINALS IN AMERICA
8-9 (1984) [hereinafter A. RYAN].
2. Id. at 9.
3. Id. In regards to the military conquest of the Soviet Union, the Baltic capitals of
Riga and Kaunas fell to the Nazis within ten days of the German invasion. The Nazi troops
then advanced to the Ukraine, reaching Kiev just twenty days after they entered Russia. Fi-
nally, by the end of that summer, the Nazis had cut off Leningrad and moved forward to
conquer Moscow. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 11.
6. Id.
7. Id. (quoting Document 3943-PS, IMT, June 17, 1942).
8. Id. at 11.
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[had] been completely purged of Jews.' ,9 While in Estonia, the Ein-
satzgruppen enlisted the help of the local auxiliary to eliminate the
Jews.10 One report in 1942 stated, " '[today there are no more Jews
in Estonia.' "I
Perhaps the most pro-German group in the Soviet Union were
the Ukrainians. 12 The people of the Ukraine were a nationalistic peo-
ple who did not like being ruled by the Soviets' 3 and they saw the
Nazis as their liberators from communism. ' 4  Moreover, many
Ukrainians were "Volksdeutsche", decendents of seventeenth century
German settlers.' 5 They were proud of their German culture and
considered the Nazis as their kinsmen.' 6 Due to these circumstances,
many Ukrainians assisted the Nazis in killing the Jews by forming
auxiliary police that led the Einsatzgruppen to the Jewish quarters.' 7
The number of Jews massacred in the Ukraine made it the biggest
action of its kind to take place in the Soviet Union.1 8
By 1944, one million Jews had been killed in Latvia, Lithuania,
Estonia, and the Ukraine by the Nazis and their Baltic and Ukrainian
collaborators.' 9 Also in that year, the Soviet Army began to push
Hitler's troops back to Germany.20 Thousands of Balts and Ukraini-
ans fled to Germany. 2' When Germany fell to the Allies, these people
became refugees or "displaced persons" (DPs) along with the millions
of others with whom the Allied forces had to deal.22 The Allies set up
displaced person camps in Europe to handle the influx of refugees.23
9. Id. at 12 (quoting Document 3876-PS, January 1-31, 1942). The Germans were so
impressed that they sent a batallion of Lithuainans to neighboring Byelorussia to continue the
job of killing the Jewish population. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 9.
13. See id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 10. Not all of the Ukrainians were pro-Nazi. Many of the people disliked the
Nazis as much as they disliked the Communists. For the Jews in the Ukraine, however, this
really did not matter because there were enough pro-Nazi Ukrainians to assist the Einsatz-
gruppen eliminate the Jews. Id. at 9.
18. Id. at 10.
19. Id. at 12.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id. Among those in the DP camps were Eastern Europeans who were workers in
Germany during the war; those whose property was destroyed during the war; and Jews who
had either hid from the Nazis or survived the concentration camps. Id. at 8.
23. Id. at 12-13.
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Eventually, the problem of the DPs became so grave that the Allies,
including the United States, had to expand their immigration quotas
in order to give them a place to live.
24
The Allies also signed treaties promising to deliver Nazi war
criminals for punishment.25 In the spirit of these agreements, United
States immigration law excluded the entry of war criminals into the
United States as displaced persons.26 Despite this safeguard, a sur-
prising number of war criminals successfully immigrated into this
country, and lead peaceful lives as model citizens.27 Although the
government was aware that these alleged war criminals entered the
United States as displaced persons, the Immigration and Naturaliza-
tion Service (INS) did little to find and bring them to justice.28
In response to Congressional pressure, however, the Attorney
General established an Office of Special Investigation (OSI), a unit in
the Criminal Division of the Department of Justice, to take over the
investigation of suspected war criminals from the INS. 29 The OSI has
the responsibility of investigating these suspected war criminals in or-
der to eventually bring denaturalization and deportation proceedings
against them.3
0
This Comment will address the constitutionality of the denatu-
ralization and deportation of suspected Nazi war criminals residing in
the United States. It will address whether the denaturalization and
deportation proceedings instituted against alleged Nazi war criminals
who became United States citizens violate their constitutional rights
protected by prohibitions against bills of attainder and ex post facto
laws, and the sixth, seventh, and fifth amendments.
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
A. Post War Agreements
One of the first post war agreements signed by the Allies to deal
24. Id. at 12-15. Before the United States enacted the Displaced Persons Act, discussed
in Part IIB infra, the quota for Eastern Europeans allowed to enter the United States was
13,000 people. This was fewer than two percent of those living in the DP camps. Id. at 15.
25. Comment, Denaturalization of Nazi War Criminals: Is There Sufficient Justice For
Those Who Would Not Dispense Justice?, 40 MD. L. REV. 39, 40 (1981) [hereinafter Denatural-
ization of Nazi War Criminals].
26. Id. at 40-41.
27. Id. at 41-42.
28. Gelfand, Nazi War Criminals in the United States. It's Never Too Late For Justice, 19
VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L. L. 855, 864-65 (1986) [hereinafter Gelfand].
29. Id. at 871.
30. See generally, Gelfand, supra note 28, at 871.
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with Nazi war criminals was the Moscow Declaration. 31 The Mos-
cow Declaration provided that minor war criminals be returned to the
states where they committed their crimes in order to be judged by that
state's municipal laws. 32 Yet the fate of major war criminals, whose
offenses had no particular geographic location, would be decided at a
later date.
33
The Allies determined the disposition of these major war
criminals in the London Agreement.34 This treaty established the In-
ternational Military Tribunal (Tribunal) 35 whose responsibility it was
to justly and promptly punish the major war criminals of Europe.
3 6
The charter gave the Tribunal power to adjudicate crimes against
peace, war crimes, and crimes against humanity.37 Moreover, the ju-
risdiction of the Tribunal was extended to the trial of major war
criminals whose crimes had no specific geographic location. 38
3 1. Moscow Conference of Foreign Secretaries, Nov. 1, 1943, United States-United King-
dom-U.S.S.R., 1943 For. Rel. I. 749, Annex 10 [hereinafter Moscow Declaration].
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Agreement by the Government of the United States of America, the Provincial Gov-
emnment of the French Republic, the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics for the Prosecution and Punish-
ment of the Major War Criminals of the European Axis, Aug. 8, 1945, 59 Stat. 1544, E.A.S.
472, U.N.T.S. 279 [hereinafter London Agreement].
35. Id. art. 1.
36. Charter of the International Military Tribunal, Aug. 8, 1945, art. 1, 59 Stat. 1546,
E.A.S. 472 (hereinafter Charter].
•37. Id. art. 6. These crimes are defined as:
CRIMES AGAINST PEACE: namely, planning, preparation, initiation or waging of a
war of aggression, or a war in violation of international treaties, agreements or assur-
ances, or participation in a common plan or conspiracy for the accomplishment of
any of the foregoing;
WAR CRIMES: namely, violations of the laws or customs of war. Such violations
shall include, but not be limited to, murder, ill-treatment or deportation to slave
labor or for any other purpose of civilian labor of or in occupied territory, murder or
ill-treatment of prisoners of war or persons on the seas, killing of hostages, plunder of
public or private property, wanton destruction of cities, towns or villages, or devasta-
tion not justified by military necessity;
CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY: namely, murder, extermination, enslavement, depor-
tation, and other inhumane acts committed against any civilian population, before or
during the war; [footnote omitted] or persecutions on political, racial or religious
grounds in the execution of or in connection with any crime within the jurisdiction of
the Tribunal, whether or not in violation of the domestic law of the country where
perpetrated. Id.
These are generally recognized as the contemporary meanings of these crimes. Moeller,
United States Treatment ofAlleged Nazi War Criminals: International Law, Immigration Law,
and the Need For International Cooperation, 25 VA. J. INT'L L. 793, 798 (1985) [hereinafter
Moeller].
38. London Agreement, supra note 34, art. 1.
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The London Agreement provisions were implemented at the Nu-
remberg trials of 1945, where the Tribunal tried twenty-two suspected
war criminals over ten months.3 9 These trials resulted in nineteen
convictions; twelve received a death sentence, three received life in
prison, and four received periods of imprisonment ranging from ten to
twenty years. 40 However, despite the Nuremberg trials, the Allies'
commitment to the just punishment of these criminals was not suc-
cessful. Many of the convicted war criminals did not serve full
sentences. 4' Moreover, the majority of Nazi war criminals completely
avoided prosecution, 42 some by entering the United States under the
Displaced Persons Act (DPA).
43
B. Displaced Persons Act-The Entry of Nazi War Criminals Into
the United States
The DPA 44 adopted the definition of "displaced person" given in
the Constitution of the International Refugee Organization (IRO).45
The Constitution defined a displaced person as one who, because of
the actions of the Nazi powers, and others defined in the Constitution,
"has been deported from, or has been obliged to leave his country of
nationality or of former habitual residence, such as persons who were
compelled to undertake forced labour or who were deported for ra-
cial, religious or political reasons." 46
Under section 2(b) of the DPA, a displaced person was specified
as an individual defined under the IRO Constitution as a concern of
that organization. 47 The DPA allowed, with some conditions, the ad-
39. Gelfand, supra note 28, at 859.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 860.
42. Id.
43. A. RYAN, supra note 1, at 26.
44. Displaced Persons Act, Pub. L. No. 80-774, 62 Stat. 1009 (1948) amended by Act of
June 16, 1950, Pub. L. No. 81-555, 64 Stat. 219 (codified at 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 1951-1975
(1982)) (expired 1952) [hereinafter DPA].
45. Id. at § 2(b); Constitution of the International Refugee Organization, Dec. 16, 1946,
62 Stat. 3037, T.I.A.S. 1846, 18 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter IRO Constitution]. The IRO was
established by the United Nations in order to resettle persons displaced by the Second World
War. Gelfand, supra note 28, at 861 n.23.
46. IRO Constitution, supra note 45, Annex I, pt. I, § B.
47. DPA § 2(b). The IRO excluded the following people, among others, from its concern
who consequently were not considered as displaced persons under the DPA: "a. [Persons
shown] to have assisted the enemy in persecuting civil populations of countries, Members of
the United Nations; b. [Persons shown] to have voluntarily assisted the enemy forces since the
outbreak of the second world war in their operations against the United Nations [footnote
omitted]. IRO Constitution, supra note 45, Annex I, pt. II.
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mission into the United States of certain displaced persons without
regard to immigration quotas, for a period of two years.4  There
were, however, two provisions that limited the provisions of the DPA.
Under section 10, any person who willfully made a misrepresentation
in order to gain entry into the United States as an eligible displaced
person could not be admitted.49 In addition, the provisions of section
13 provided that no visa be issued to any person who voluntarily per-
secuted people because of race, religion, or national origin, or to any
person who was involved in an organization hostile to the United
States.50
In reality, however, the DPA had a discriminatory effect, since it
was written to exclude many concentration camp survivors and to
include Baits, Ukrainians, and German Volksdeutsche.5' The first
discriminatory provision of the DPA stated that only those refugees
who had arrived at displaced person camps by December, 1945, were
eligible.5 2 As a consequence of this provision, only about 10,000 Jews
were eligible to enter the United States as displaced persons.5 3 More-
over, the DPA required that 40% of the immigrants be from coun-
tries that had been "de facto annexed by a foreign power," another
way of referring to Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia which had been
taken over by the Soviet Union.5 4 The DPA also held open 30% of
the spaces for farmers, 55 which proved a big advantage to the Ukraini-
ans and a disadvantage to the Jews since fewer than 4% of Jews quali-
fied for entry into the United States under this category.5 6 Finally,
Congress gave special preference to the Volksdeutsche if they arrived
in Germany during or after the war.5 7 Consequently, although many
Balts and Ukrainians were Nazi collaborators,58 the DPA made it
easy for them to gain entrance into the United States as displaced
persons.
Many proponents of the DPA claimed that its provisions would
48. DPA § 3(a).
49. Id. § 10.
50. Id. § 13.
51. A. RYAN, supra note 1, at 16.
52. DPA § 2(c). see also, A. RYAN, supra note 1, at 16.
53. A. RYAN, supra note 1, at 16. This date cut off the eligibility of more than 100,000
Jews who had fled from Poland to the DP camps in 1946. Id.
54. DPA § 3(a) (unamended); see also, A. RYAN, supra note 1, at 17.
55. See A. RYAN, supra note 1, at 17.
56. DPA § 6(a) (unamended).
57. Id. § 2(c); see also, A. RYAN, supra note 1, at 17.
58. See supra text accompanying notes 6-18.
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exclude Nazi collaborators through a two-step screening process. 59
Step one was an investigation by the IRO, who would refuse to certify
a refugee as a displaced person if he had been a Nazi collaborator who
had assisted in persecution. 6° However, many saw these investiga-
tions as superficial and corrupt. 61 Since in the eyes of the IRO, the
Volksdeutsche had left their countries voluntarily to assist the Nazis,
they were not considered displaced persons and, therefore, were not
covered by the IRO Constitution. Consequently, they were not
screened for evidence of Nazi collaboration.
62
The second step was the establishment of the Displaced Persons
Commission by Congress.6 3 The Commission's responsibility was to
investigate the refugee applicants to ensure they did not fall under the
DPA section 13 exception. 64 However, it was almost impossible for
the commission to identify Nazis.65 The commission had a million
DPs to investigate and could not extensively check into each back-
ground.66 The application and screening process was unorganized
and haphazard, with most of the emphasis placed on the application
filled out by the refugee himself.67
Approximately 400,000 persons entered the United States under
the DPA before it expired in 1952.68 An estimated 10,000 of this
number are suspected Nazi war criminals. 69 And although the DPA
expired over thirty years ago,70 its provisions govern the denaturaliza-
tion proceedings in those cases involving refugees admitted into the
United States in 1948 - 1952.7"
III. INVESTIGATION/DEPORTATION OF ALLEGED NAZI WAR
CRIMINALS
In its efforts to meet its obligations to prosecute alleged Nazi war
59. A. RYAN, supra note 1, at 20.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. DPA § 8; see also, A. RYAN, supra note 1, at 20.
64. See supra note 50, and accompanying text.
65. A. RYAN, supra note 1, at 22.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 25. Eighty-five percent were displaced persons while fifteen percent were Volk-
sdeutsche. Id.
69. Id. at 26.
70. Exec. Order No. 10,382, 3 C.F.R. 892, reprinted in 50 U.S.C. app. § 1957 (1982).
71. See generally DPA § 2.
1989]
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criminals, 72 the United States has sought the deportation of these
criminals. The deportation of a war criminal by the United States
under its immigration laws differs in several ways from the extradition
of a criminal to stand trial in a requesting state for war crimes. Only
aliens may be deportable,7 3 while United States citizens are extradita-
ble. Consequently, naturalized United States citizens must have their
citizenship taken away before they can be deported. 74
Deportation merely expels undesirable aliens,7 5 while extradition
returns individuals to requesting states specifically to stand trial for
their crimes. Consequently, an alien subject to deportation may
choose the state to which he will be sent.76 In recent years, the United
States government has sought to rid this country of alleged Nazi war
criminals through denaturalization and deportation proceedings. 77
In order to investigate and process the deportation of suspected
war criminals in the United States, the Attorney General established
the Office of Special Investigations (OSI).78 From 1978 until July
1984, the OSI filed forty-eight cases regarding suspected Nazi war
criminals.7 9 Within these forty-eight cases, thirty were denaturaliza-
tion cases and eighteen were deportation cases. 80 There have been a
total of twenty-four verdicts handed down in these cases filed by the
OSI, twenty-one in its favor.81
Deportation occurs under section 340 of the Immigration and
Nationality Act (INA).8 2 Under this provision, a naturalized citizen's
certificate of naturalization can be revoked if it was procured by either
concealment of a material fact or by willful misrepresentation. 83
Moreover, in 1978, Congress amended the classes of deportable aliens.
This provision, known as the Holtzman Amendment,84 was specifi-
72. See supra text accompanying notes 31-38.
73. 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (1982); see also, Moeller, supra note 37, at 813-14.
74. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1260 (1982); see also, Moeller, supra note 37, at 814.
75. 8 U.S.C. § 1253(a) (1982).
76. Id.
77. Moeller, supra note 37, at 814.
78. See supra text accompanying notes 29-30.
79. A. RYAN, supra note 1, at 258.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 259.
82. Immigration and Nationality Act, Pub. L. No. 414, 66 Stat. 163 (1952) (codified at 8
U.S.C. §§ 1101-1557 (1982)) [hereinafter INA].
83. Id. § 340, 8 U.S.C. § 1451 (1982). This provision is similar to the limitation on the
entry of displaced persons into the United States under section 10 of the DPA. See supra note
49 and accompanying text.
84. 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(19) (Supp. 1987) [hereinafter Holtzman Amendment].
[Vol. 11: 117
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cally designed to allow for the deportation of any alien who ordered
the prosecution of any person because of race, religion or national
origin under the Nazi government or in any government in any area
occupied by the military of the Nazi government.8 5 It is through
these two statutes that the United States initiates deportation proceed-
ings against suspected Nazi war criminals.
IV. CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE DEPORTATION OF SUSPECTED
NAZI WAR CRIMINALS
The only United States Supreme Court case to address the depor-
tation of suspected Nazi war criminals is Fedorenko v. United States.
8 6
Fedorenko, a Ukrainian, was drafted into the Soviet army in 1941 and
subsequently captured by the Germans. 7 After training as a concen-
tration camp guard, he served as a guard at Treblinka in Poland from
1942 to 1943.88 Treblinka was a concentration camp at which hun-
dreds of thousands of Jews were murdered. Between 1945 and 1949,
Fedorenko discarded his army uniform and worked in Germany as a
laborer.89
In 1949, Fedorenko applied for entry into the United States as a
displaced person. 9° He lied about his wartime activities claiming to
have been a farmer in Poland from 1934-42, at which time he had
been deported to Germany and been forced to work in a factory.9 1
The United States admitted Fedorenko for permanent residence and
he subsequently used the same false story to gain his United States
85. Id. Specifically, the Holtzman Amendment provides for the deportation of any alien
who:
(1) during the period beginning on March 23, 1933 and ending on May 8, 1945,
under the direction of, or in association with-
(A) the Nazi government of Germany,
(B) any government in any area occupied by the military forces of the Nazi
government of Germany,
(C) any government established with the assistance or cooperation of the Nazi
government of Germany, or
(D) any government which was an ally of the Nazi government of Germany,
ordered, incited, assisted or otherwise participated in the persecution
of any person because of race, religion, national origin, or political
opinion.
Id. The Holtzman Amendment is similar to the limitation on the entry of displaced persons
into the United States under section 13 of the DPA.
86. Fedorenko v. United States, 449 U.S. 490 (1981).
87. Id. at 494.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 496.
91. Id.
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citizenship in 1970.92 The United States brought a denaturalization
action against Fedorenko alleging he was ineligible for his DPA visa
because he committed war crimes at Treblinka and that he procured
his naturalization certificate illegally or by willfully misrepresenting
material facts. 93
Several common threads run through all of the Nazi war crimi-
nal cases such as the Fedorenko case. First, all the defendants either
participated in the persecution of people because of race, religion or
national origin, or were involved in movements that were hostile to
the United States during World War II. Second, they all gained entry
into the United States by willful misrepresentations on their visa ap-
plications. This made them ineligible to enter the United States as
DPs.94 Consequently, they are subject to deportation under the provi-
sions of the Holtzman Amendment. 95 Moreover, since these men also
illegally procured their certificate of naturalization by concealment of
a material fact or by willful misrepresentation, their naturalized citi-
zenship must be revoked.96
A denaturalization proceeding is a suit in equity,97 governed by
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 98 with no right to a jury trial. 99
At the same time, there are elements of criminal proceedings present
in denaturalization suits. The primary example is that the govern-
ment's proof of a violation of immigration law by a Nazi war criminal
must include proof of his criminal past and its subsequent conceal-
ment in order to gain entry into the United States.1°° The govern-
ment, in effect, must prove that the defendant concealed his wartime
activities and by proving that the defendant lied, the government
must prove that he committed the crimes for which he lied.' 0 '
Moreover, denaturalization is itself a civil penalty for a violation
of immigration law. However, the loss of liberty that may accompany
this penalty, especially before deportation, may be as significant as
92. Id. at 497.
93. Id. at 497-98.
94. See supra notes 49-50 and accompanying text.
95. 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(19) (Supp. 1987) and supra text accompanying notes 84-85.
96. 8 U.S.C. § 1251-600) (1980) and supra text accompanying note 74.
97. United States v. Walus, 453 F. Supp. 699, 703 (N.D. Il1. 1978), rev'd on other
grounds, 616 F.2d 283 (7th Cir. 1980).
98. United States v. Minerich, 250 F.2d 721, 726 (7th Cir. 1975).
99. Walus, 453 F. Supp. at 703.
100. Denaturalization of Nazi War Criminals, supra note 25, at 46.
101. Id.
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that which accompanies a criminal penalty. 10 2 Consequently, the
cases against suspected Nazi war criminals raise constitutional issues
regarding the prohibition against bills of attainder and ex post facto
laws, 10 3 the sixth amendment, 10 4 the seventh amendment, 105 and the
procedural safeguards of the due process clause of the fifth
amendment. 106
A. Bills of Attainder
A bill of attainder has been defined as a "legislative act which
inflicts punishment without a judicial trial."'' 0 7 In many of the denat-
uralization cases against suspected Nazi war criminals (hereinafter
defendants), the defendant argues that the Holtzman Amendment "is
a legislative enactment directed at a small group of individuals, Nazi
war criminals, for the purpose of punishing those individuals without
a judicial trial.' 08 Consequently, the Holtzman Amendment consti-
tutes a prohibited bill of attainder.' °9 Two examples of defendants
who contend the Holtzman Amendment is a prohibited bill of attain-
der are Conrad Schellong" ° and Reinhold Kulle."'
In 1934, Schellong joined the Special Commando unit of the
branch of the Nazi Party known as the Storm Troopers (SS). 1 2 The
members of this unit were assigned to guard duties at Sachsenburg
concentration camp in Germany."13 Early in 1936, Schellong was as-
signed to the "Death's Head" guard unit of the SS at Dachau concen-
tration camp. 1 4 He remained at Dachau until 1939 where his duties
102. Moeller, supra note 37, at 819.
103. The United States Constitution states, "No bill of attainder or ex post facto law shall
be passed." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3.
104. The sixth amendment provides for the rights to a speedy trial, a jury trial, and legal
counsel. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
105. The seventh amendment preserves the right to a jury trial in suits at common law.
U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
106. The fifth amendment states that, "[n]o person shall... be deprived of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law ...." U.S. CONST. amend. V.
107. United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 315 (1946) (quoting Cummings v. Missouri, 71
U.S. (4 Wall) 277, 323 (1866)).
108. Linnas v. INS, 790 F.2d 1024, 1028 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 600 (1986).
109. Linnas, 790 F.2d at 1028. See also, Schellong v. INS, 805 F.2d 655, 662 (7th Cir.
1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 1624 (1987); Kulle v. INS, 825 F.2d 1188, 1191 (7th Cir. 1987),
cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 773 (1988).
110. Schellong, 805 F.2d at 662.
111. Kulle, 825 F.2d at 1191.
112. Schellong, 805 F.2d at 656.
113. Id. at 656.
114. Id. at 656-67.
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included supervising and teaching new SS recruits on how to handle
victims. 15 Subsequently, Schellong transferred to the military arm of
the SS, known as the Waffen SS, where he served for the remainder of
the war. 1
1 6
When applying for a visa to enter the United States, Schellong
failed to mention his concentration camp background. 1 7 Instead, he
claimed that he had joined the Waffen SS in 1934 and served in the
military until the end of the war." 8 Schellong gave the same account
of his wartime activities when applying for United States citizen-
ship. 1 9 There was one major discrepancy to Schellong's story that
went past the visa and naturalization examiners. The Waffen SS was
not formed until 1939, so Schellong could not have joined it in
1934.120 This discrepancy went unnoticed and Schellong became a
United States citizen in 1962.121
The story of Reinhold Kulle is very similar. Kulle was a member
of the SS from 1940-45.122 In 1942, Kulle was assigned to the Death's
Head Battalion at Gross-Rosen concentration camp where he worked
as a guard and a training leader. 23 During Kulle's time at Gross-
Rosen, the German's persecuted those deemed enemies of the Third
Reich for reasons of race, religion, national origin or political opin-
ion.' 24 Kulle is also accused of taking part in the forced evacuation of
prisoners from Gross-Rosen to the Mauthausen concentration camp
in Austria. 25 Kulle entered the United States fraudulently by not
disclosing his activities at Gross-Rosen on his immigration papers.
26
He was admitted into the United States for permanent residence in
1957.127
In deciding whether the Holtzman Amendment is a bill of attain-
der, the courts concede that it is a legislative act, so the focus of the
inquiry becomes whether the Act constitutes punishment. To do so
115. A. RYAN, supra note 1, at 265.
116. Schellong, 805 F.2d at 657; A. RYAN, supra note 1, at 265.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Schellong v. INS, 805 F.2d 655, 659 (7th Cir. 1986), cert denied, 107 S. Ct. 1624
(1987); A. RYAN, supra note 1, at 265.
121. Schellong, 805 F.2d at 657; A. RYAN, supra note 1, at 265.
122. Kulle v. INS, 825 F.2d 1188, 1190 (7th Cir. 1987), cert denied, 108 S. Ct. 773 (1988).
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id.
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the court considers the following three factors: "'(1) whether the
challenged statute falls within the historical meaning of legislative
punishment; (2) whether the statute, viewed in terms of the type and
severity of burdens imposed reasonably can be said to further non-
punitive legislative purposes; and (3) whether the legislative record
evinces a congressional intent to punish.' ",128
With regard to the first criteria, exclusion of a United States citi-
zen has sometimes been thought to constitute punishment that is an
equivalent to banishment. 129 Therefore, defendants believe that the
Holtzman Amendment fits within this meaning of punishment be-
cause deportation is the equivalent of banishment. 130 However, the
Supreme Court has held that the sanction of denaturalization does not
constitute punishment. 131 The Court emphasized that denaturaliza-
tion "simply deprives him [defendant] of his ill-gotten privileges....
[It] makes nothing fraudulent or unlawful that was honest and lawful
when it was done. It imposes no new penalty upon the
wrongdoer."13 2
The courts have reasoned that although deportation is often se-
verely burdensome, it is not punishment.133 The exclusion of individ-
uals such as Schellong and Kulle from entering this country would
not be considered punishment. To say that their deportation is pun-
ishment by virtue of their fraudulent presence in the United States
would grant defendants more protection under the law as a result of
their willful misrepresentations than they would have had prior to any
misrepresentations.134 Therefore, the courts have held that the Holtz-
man Amendment does not constitute a legislative punishment.
135
In order to consider whether the Holtzman Amendment consti-
tutes a bill of attainder under the second factor, courts look at the
type and severity of the burdens imposed. 13 6 Courts have recognized
that deportation generally imposes severe burdens on the deportee,
128. Linnas v. INS, 790 F.2d 1024, 1029 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 600 (1986)
(quoting Selective Service System v. Minnesota Public Interest Research Group, 468 U.S. 841
(1984) ((quoting Nixon v. Administrator of General Services, 433 U.S. 425, 473 (1977))).
129. Linnas, 790 F.2d at 1029.
130. Id.
131. Johannessen v. United States, 225 U.S. 227, 242 (1912).
132. Id.
133. Linnas v. INS, 790 F.2d 1024, 1030 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 600 (1986).
134. Id.
135. Id; Schellong v. INS, 805 F.2d 655, 662 (7th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 1624
(1987); Kulle v. INS, 825 F.2d 1188, 1191 (7th Cir. 1987), cert denied, 108 S. Ct. 773 (1988).
136. Linnas, 790 F.2d at 1030.
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but conclude that severity itself does not turn a burden into punish-
ment.1 37 The courts have recognized that deportation furthers the
non-punitive legislative goal of protecting United States citizens from
harmful persons. 38 The courts believe it is reasonable for United
States citizens, through their elected representatives in Washington,
to pass a bill which would deport Nazi war criminals, thus eliminat-
ing the possibility of having to share their communities with sus-
pected murderers.139 Moreover, it is also reasonable for the United
States not to wish to be known as a haven for Nazi war criminals.140
The courts, however, may not consider the type and severity of
the burdens imposed in these proceedings. The case of Karl Linnas is
a prime example. Evidence showed that Linnas, born in Estonia, was
chief of the Tartu concentration camp during the war, a time when
Linnas claimed to have been a university student.' 4' Upon deporta-
tion, an alien can choose the country to which he will be sent. 42 But
for many suspected Nazi war criminals there is no real choice. Lin-
nas, for example, designated the "free and independent Republic of
Estonia" as his final destination. 43 The Soviet Union annexed the
independent Republic of Estonia after World War II, so Linnas ap-
parently meant an office building in New York which currently
houses representatives of the independent Republic of Estonia.144 The
immigration judge interpreted this designation to mean the geo-
graphic location of Estonia in the Soviet Union. 45 Linnas had previ-
ously been tried, convicted and sentenced to death in absentia by the
Soviet Union. 146
The fury and controversy that surrounded Linnas' eventual de-
portation to the Soviet Union in 1987,147 suggests that the court did
not consider the true severity of the burdens of this case. Linnas, a
sixty-seven year old man, was sent to face certain imprisonment and
137. Id. (citing Mahler v. Eby, 264 U.S. 32, 39 (1924)).
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id. This was in fact one of Congress' purposes in passing the Holtzman Amendment.
See infra, note 159 and accompanying text.
141. Linnas v. INS, 790 F.2d 1024, 1026 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 600 (1986).
142. 8 U.S.C.§ 1253(a) (1982); see also supra text accompanying note 76.
143. Linnas, 790 F.2d at 1027.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Cooper, The Linnas Case: Was Justice Done? NEWSWEEK, May 4, 1987, at 33 [here-
inafter Cooper].
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possible execution without the benefit of due process.14 8 A possible
repercussion of this decision has the United States indirectly sanction-
ing a totalitarian form of justice in the Soviet Union. The courts must
strike more of a balance between the legislative goals of the Holtzman
Amendment to keep Nazi war criminals out of the United States, and
the specific burdens imposed on the deportees.
In assessing the third bill of attainder requirement, the courts
have looked at the legislative history of the Holtzman Amendment.
Congress became interested in the issue of Nazi war criminals due to
the efforts of Representatives Joshua Eilberg of Pennsylvania and
Elizabeth Holtzman of Brooklyn.1 49 Prior to 1973, the INS filed nine
cases against alleged Nazi collaborators with less than successful re-
sults.150 Three were lost at trial and were not appealed by the govern-
ment. 151 Of the six that eventually resulted in deportation orders,
three were reversed.1
5 2
These results prompted a General Accounting Office (GAO) in-
spection of INS records concerning its investigation of suspected Nazi
war criminals. 1 3 Holtzman and Eilberg ordered this investigation
based in part on an apprehension that the INS was conspiring to ob-
struct investigations of suspected Nazi war criminals or to stop them
altogether.154 While the GAO investigation (and a subsequent FBI
investigation) revealed no conspiracy, it did indicate that INS did an
inadequate job in two of three cases which the GAO investigated.
55
Further investigation and pressure on the Departments of State
and Justice by Eilberg and Holtzman (both were Chairman of the
House Judiciary Committee's subcommittee on immigration) led to
two important developments in the Nazi war criminal investigations.
One was the establishment of the OSI.156 The other was passage of
the Holtzman Amendment.157 According to the bill's legislative his-
tory, the purpose of the bill is "to exclude from admission into the
148. Linnas' conviction was announced by a Soviet Journal three weeks before his trial.
Soviet Firing Squad Awaits, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, April 13, 1987, at 14 [hereinafter
Soviet Firing Squad Awaits].
149. See generally, A. RYAN, supra note 1, at 53-61.
150. Id. at 42.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 44.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. See supra text accompanying notes 78-85.
157. Id.
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United States aliens who have persecuted any person on the basis of
race, religion, national origin, or political opinion, and to facilitate the
deportation of such aliens who have been admitted into the United
States."15 8 Moreover, Congress' goals in passing the amendment were
the need to "put our government squarely on record as denying a
sanctuary in the United States to Nazi war criminals" and to serve as
a clear reaffirmation of this country's commitment to the most basic
of human rights.1 59 The courts, therefore, have found no evidence of
Congressional intent to use the Holtzman Amendment to punish.
16°
B. Ex Post Facto Laws
In a related argument, defendants, like Bohdan Koziy, claim that
the Holtzman Amendment operates as an ex post facto law in viola-
tion of the Constitution.1 61 Koziy was a member of the Ukrainian
Auxiliary under Nazi rule from 1940-44.162 Upon entering the
United States under the DPA, Koziy failed to disclose his wartime
participation, claiming to have spent the war as a tailor and farmer. 
163
He became a United States citizen in 1956.164
An ex post facto law is defined as a law "that makes certain ac-
tions or behaviors unlawful after the fact."1 65 The Holtzman Amend-
ment, passed in 1978, requires the deportation of persons who
participated in Nazi persecution from 1933 to 1939 to be deported.1 66
Consequently, defendants contend that the statute is unconstitutional
because it applies to persons who became naturalized before its
enactment.
The Supreme Court answered defendant's contention many years
earlier in Johannessen v. United States. 1 67 In that case, the Court held
that the prohibition against ex post facto laws relates only to those
158. H.R. Rep. No. 1452, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1978 U.S. Code Cong. &
Admin. News 4700.
159. 124 CONG. REC. H31647 (daily ed. Sept. 26, 1978) (statements of Rep. Holtzman).
160. Linnas v. INS, 790 F.2d 1024, 1030 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 600 (1986).
161. United States v. Koziy, 728 F.2d 1314, 1320 (1lth Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 835
(1984); See also, Schellong v. INS, 805 F.2d 655, 662 (7th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct.
1624 (1987); Kulle v. INS, 825 F.2d 1188, 1191 (7th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 773
(1988).
162. A. RYAN, supra note 1, at 261-62.
163. Id. at 262.
164. Id.
165. Schellong, 805 F.2d at 662.
166. Id.
167. Johannessen v. United States, 225 U.S. 227, 242 (1912).
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statutes imposing punishment. 168 Since the court has already decided
that deportation is not a form of punishment, 169 the Holtzman
Amendment could not be considered an ex post facto law since it is
not a form of legislative punishment. The court in Koziy stated,
" '[t]he act imposes no punishment upon an alien who has previously
procured a certificate of citizenship by fraud or other illegal conduct.
It simply deprives him of his ill-gotten privileges.' ",170
C. Bill of Rights
1. Sixth Amendment
Many of the defendants in these cases also assert violations of
their rights secured by the Bill of Rights. 171 One such claim brought
by Frank Walus is that the proceedings against these defendants are
in violation of their sixth amendment right to a speedy trial. 172 Walus
was a member of the German Gestapo and 55.173 Between 1939-43
he was accused of committing atrocities against the Jews living in
Polish Ghettos. 74 Walus concealed his membership in these groups
and his alleged wartime activities in obtaining his United States citi-
zenship. 175 The United States sought to deport Walus and the other
defendants based on crimes that had occurred forty to fifty years ago
and the defendants consequently claimed that this violated their right
to a speedy trial. 176
However, the courts have held that the sixth amendment applies
only to criminal prosecutions and does not apply to denaturalization
and deportation proceedings. 77 Thus the excessive delay which oc-
168. Id.
169. See supra notes 128-35 and accompanying text.
170. United States v. Koziy, 728 F.2d 1314, 1320 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 835
(1984) (quoting Johannessen, 225 U.S. at 242-43). After Koziy's deportation order was up-
held, he left his home in Florida and fled to Costa Rica, where he and his wife had secured
resident visas. E. Barnes, Accused, LIFE, May 1987, at 54.
171. E.g., Koziy, 728 F.2d at 1320; United States v. Walus, 453 F. Supp. 699, 716 (N.D.
Ill. 1978), rev'don other grounds, 616 F.2d 283 (7th Cir. 1980); Linnas v. INS, 790 F.2d 1024,
1030-32 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 600 (1986).
172. Walus, 453 F. Supp. at 716.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id. The sixth amendment by its terms is limited to only criminal cases:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public
trial, by an impartial jury of the state and district wherein the crime shall have been
committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the wit-
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curs in denaturalization proceedings is ignored. Moreover, the deter-
mination by the courts that denaturalization and deportation suits are
not forms of punishment 78 has thus prevented the application of the
sixth amendment rights to later denaturalization and deportation
suits. These cases demonstrate that constitutional procedural protec-
tions are only available to defendants who face punishment in viola-
tion of a criminal statute per se. 179
Even if the courts did pay attention to the long period of time it
has taken to institute these proceedings, forty to fifty years of inaction
does not justify more inaction. Courts have held that these defend-
ants entered the United States illegally, yet have been allowed to live
peaceful lives as United States citizens.180 The denaturalization and
deportation proceedings only seek to correct mistakes that were made
forty to fifty years ago when the defendants were granted entrance
into the United States.
2. Seventh Amendment
Walus also claims a violation of his seventh amendment right to
a trial by jury.' 81 Traditionally, defendants have not been given a
right to a jury trial in civil denaturalization suits. 82 Walus, however,
argues that there are common law issues presented in the cases of
Nazi war criminals because of the criminal allegations that the gov-
ernment must prove.'8 3 The courts do not accept this argument. In
Luria v. United States, 84 the Supreme Court held that a denaturaliza-
tion suit is an equitable proceeding and not a suit at common law. 8 5
Subsequent courts have stated that a denaturalization suit is a civil
nesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor,
and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense.
U.S. CONST. amend. VI (emphasis added).
178. See supra notes 128-33 and accompanying text.
179. See e.g., United States v. Walus, 453 F. Supp. 699, 716 (N.D. Il1. 1978), rev'd on other
grounds, 616 F.2d 283 (7th Cir. 1980) (denial of sixth amendment right to a speedy trial).
180. E.g., Bohdan Koziy owned and operated a motel near the white Florida beaches in
Ft. Lauderdale. A. RYAN, supra note 1, at 262. Karl Linnas lived for twenty-five years as a
land surveyor on Long Island. Soviet Firing Squad Awaits, supra note 148, at 14.
181. United States v. Walus, 453 F. Supp. 699, 702 (N.D. I11. 1978), rev'd on other
grounds, 616 F.2d 283 (7th Cir. 1980). The seventh amendment states in part, "[i]n Suits at
common law. . . the right of trial by jury shall be preserved ...." U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
182. United States v. Mansour, 170 F. 671, 674 (S.D.N.Y. 1908), aff'd without opinion,
226 U.S. 604 (1912).
183. Walus, 453 F. Supp. at 703.
184. Luria v. United States, 231 U.S. 9 (1913).
185. Id. at 27-28.
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proceeding in equity that only considers whether the defendant's cer-
tificate of naturalization should be revoked and his citizenship can-
celed.18 6 Consequently, courts hearing Nazi war criminal cases have
applied Luria by not allowing a jury trial in these denaturalization
suits. 8 7
3. Fifth Amendment
Finally, defendants argue that the denaturalization and deporta-
tion suits violate their fifth amendment due process rights. 88 This
contention is especially relevant in Karl Linnas' case. As already
noted, Linnas was denaturalized and deported to the Soviet Union
where he had been previously convicted and sentenced to death in
absentia. 8 9 Linnas claimed that deportation under these circum-
stances will deprive him of his life without due process of law.190
First, Linnas claims that since he is being sent to the Soviet
Union where he has already been tried and convicted, he is effectively
being extradited in the absence of an extradition treaty.' 9' The court
in Linnas, however, ruled that the government's action did not consti-
tute extradition. 92 It based its holding on the fact that extradition
must be initiated by a foreign state and that while the Soviet Union
does have an interest in the trial of Nazi war criminals, the force be-
hind the denaturalization and deportation of Linnas is the United
States government. 93 The court stated "[r]uling this procedure to be
an extradition would greatly reduce the ability of this nation to deport
those who have committed crimes of moral turpitude in their own
countries." 94
Linnas also argues he is denied his due process rights under the
Soviet justice system. Linnas claims that the outcome of his 1962 So-
viet trial was predetermined since a Soviet journal announced a guilty
186. United States v. Walus, 453 F. Supp. 699, 703 (N.D. Ill. 1978), rev'd on other
grounds, 616 F.2d 283 (7th Cir. 1980).
187. Id.
188. Linnas v. INS, 790 F.2d 1024, 1030-32 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 600 (1986).
See also, United States v. Koziy, 728 F.2d 1314, 1320 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 835
(1984); United States v. Walus, 453 F. Supp. 699, 716 (N.D. Ill. 1978), rev'd on other grounds,
616 F.2d 283 (7th Cir. 1980).
189. See Linnas, 790 F.2d at 1027; Cooper, supra note 147; see also supra text accompany-
ing notes 146-48.
190. Linnas, 790 F.2d at 1031.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Id.
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verdict three weeks before the trial even began. 195 Moreover, Linnas'
supporters claim that the government will be "turning over a citizen
to the Soviets, whose system of justice is a mockery." 196 The court,
however, addressed Linnas' contention by stating that its jurisdiction
does not extend past the United States borders and that Linnas' due
process rights have been upheld in the denaturalization and deporta-
tion proceedings against him. 197
Linnas' supporters also point out that many of the witnesses who
testified in this and other Nazi war criminal cases, were questioned in
the U.S.S.R. by OSI investigators.198 These witnesses testified under
Soviet rules and the defendants' attorneys did not have a chance to
adequately challenge their testimony. 199 The supporters raise the eth-
ical and legal question of whether the United States Government is
wrong in using Soviet supplied evidence in its prosecution of Linnas
and other suspected Nazi war criminals. 2°°
While it is true that these circumstances might have denied Lin-
nas of a defense he could have received had he been tried in the
United States, Linnas' case has received eight years of judicial review.
Despite Linnas' claims to the contrary, many judges have concluded
on the basis of clear, unequivocal and convincing evidence that Lin-
nas concealed his war crimes from United States authorities in ob-
taining his United States citizenship. 201 Moreover, even if Linnas
were to be tried for war crimes in the United States, the prosecutor
would probably have to seek Soviet assistance.20 2 The court in Linnas
pointed out that it was Linnas' due process rights that allowed him to
remain in the United States until 1987, even though the denaturaliza-
tion proceedings against him began in 1979.203
Finally, Linnas appealed to the court's sense of "decency" and
"compassion". 2°4 The court refused to consider such a plea from
195. See supra note 148.
196. Cooper, supra note 147, at 33 (quoting former white House Communications Chief
Patrick Buchanan).
197. Linnas, 790 F.2d at 1031.
198. R. Lacayo, Problems of Crime and Punishment, TIME, April 20, 1987, at 60 [hereinaf-
ter Lacayo].
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. United States v. Linnas, 527 F. Supp. 426, 439-40 (E.D.N.Y. 1981), aff'd, 685 F.2d
427 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 883 (1982).
202. Lacayo, supra note 198, at 60.
203. Linnas, 790 F.2d at 1031.
204. Id. at 1032.
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someone who had ordered the killing of innocent men, women and
children, and thus rejected his argument that these proceedings vio-
lated his right to due process of law. 20 5 The court concluded that
there is no substantive due process right not to be deported. 2°6
The Linnas case, however, may be an isolated case. An order of
deportation is useless unless the United States can find a country that
will accept the deportee. 20 7 Until such a country is found, the de-
portee stays in the United States and because he has committed no
crime in this country, is free to do as he pleases. 208 All that is left
then is someone who has been stripped of his United States citizen-
ship. This is only a symbolic gesture because the daily life of an ex-
citizen changes little.209 An ex-citizen is still entitled to welfare bene-
fits and will not lose his home, income or freedom. 210 In other words,
for most of these defendants, their denaturalization and deportation
orders allow them to carry on their lives in the United States as best
they can.211 The courts, therefore, should balance in each case the
burdens placed on defendants in granting deportation. In extreme sit-
uations, as in the case of Karl Linnas, they should be more reluctant
to issue a deportation order. If not so extreme, as in many of the
other cases, the deportation order should be granted.
The courts have held that a denaturalization proceeding is a suit
in equity.2 12 However, defendants may be afforded more protection if
these proceedings were treated as being quasi-criminal in nature. The
burden of proof in denaturalization proceedings is that the govern-
ment must prove its case by clear, unequivocal and convincing evi-
dence. 21 3 Raising the standard to beyond a reasonable doubt as in
criminal cases might institute more protection for these defendants.
A second possibility would be for the court to utilize criminal proce-
dures instead of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
205. Id.
206. Id. at 1031.
207. A. RYAN, supra note 1, at 260.
208. Id.
209. Id. at 342.
210. Id.
211. But see, E. Barnes, Accused, LiFE, May 1987, at 54. (Suspected war criminal Bohdan
Koziy fled to Costa Rica when his deportation order was upheld).
212. United States v. Walus, 453 F. Supp. 699, 716 (N.D. Ill. 1978), rev'd on other
grounds, 616 F.2d 283 (7th Cir. 1980).
213. Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U.S. 118, 125 (1943) (citing Maxwell Land-
Grant Case, 121 U.S. 325, 381 (1887); United States v. San Jacinto Tire Co., 125 U.S. 273, 300
(1888)).
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D. Non-Constitutional Arguments
There are other non-constitutionally based arguments by these
defendants against their denaturalization and deportation. First, they
argue that the government's thirty to forty year delay in prosecuting
them is prejudicial. However, the courts have held that there is no
statute of limitations in denaturalization suits. 21 4 Moreover, the de-
fense of laches is not available in a deportation proceeding. 215 There
is also no international statute of limitations barring the trial of de-
fendants on the charge of war crimes.216 Consequently, these defend-
ants are not only subject to denaturalization and deportation
proceedings in the United States, but also to war crime trials in other
countries for as long as they live.
217
Second, there is a need to control the emotional level at trial.
These immigration cases are viewed by many as a continuation of the
Nuremberg task of punishing war criminals. 218 Moreover, the factor
of emotion will be difficult for the judge to control. Testimony by
concentration camp victims in the United States courtroom has
caused "shocking testimony" and "emotional outbursts". 21 9 As a re-
sult of this problem, some judges have attempted to exclude the public
from attending certain immigration cases, but with no success.
220
Consequently, the danger is that the misplaced objective of vindicat-
ing the atrocities of the Nazis will be confused with the only objec-
tives in these cases, which is to strip the war criminal of his ill-gotten
citizenship.
V. INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION
A. International Criminal Jurisdiction
One way of ensuring that defendants are protected is through
international cooperation. International law recognizes five types of
criminal jurisdiction.221 One basis is the territorial principle which
214. Denaturalization of Nazi War Criminals, supra note 25, at 73.
215. United States v. Walus, 453 F. Supp. 699, 716 (N.D. Iln. 1978), rev'd on other
grounds, 616 F.2d 283 (7th Cir. 1980).
216. Denaturalization of Nazi War Criminals, supra note 25, at 73.
217. Id. at 74.
218. See supra notes 39-40 and accompanying text.
219. Denaturalization of Nazi War Criminals, supra note 25, at 76.
220. See, e.g., Pechter v. Lyons, 441 F. Supp. 115, 120 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (preliminary in-
junction granted because of abuse of discretion by immigration judge in barring public attend-
ance to the deportation hearing of suspected Nazi war criminal Boleslavs Maikovskis).
221. 11 M. BAssIouNI, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 4-5 (1986).
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permits jurisdiction by the state wherein the crime occurred. 222 This
is the most widely recognized form of the five types of jurisdiction.223
The second basis is nationality jurisdiction which is based on the na-
tionality of the defendant. 224 Third is the protective principle of juris-
diction which asserts jurisdiction over a crime outside of a state's
territory which is deemed to be harmful to the forum state. 225 Under
the fourth principle, passive personality, jurisdiction is based on the
nationality of the victim. 226 Finally, the fifth principle of universality
jurisdiction, allows for the jurisdiction over certain crimes that are
thought to be harmful to the international community in general.227
Under the territoriality principle, the Federal Republic of Ger-
many (West Germany) would have jurisdiction over Nazi war
criminals because the war crimes were committed within its territorial
boundaries. However, the West German government has made it
clear that it will only accept those Nazi war criminals who are Ger-
man citizens. 228 However, most of the Nazi war criminals who en-
tered this country under the DPA came in through loopholes created
in the Act for Balts, Ukrainians and Volksdeutsche.229 Consequently,
West Germany will not try these defendants because they were not
German citizens.
230
Another important principle for exercising jurisdiction over Nazi
war criminals is universality jurisdiction. This principle allows for the
extra-territorial exercise of jurisdiction by any country as long as the
crime has been defined by the laws of nations.231 Although such
crimes are defined by the laws of nations, the actual prosecution of
them must take place in municipal state courts under municipal state
laws.
2 3 2
222. Moeller, supra note 37, at 850-51.
223. Id.
224. Id. at 851.
225. Id. at 852.
226. Id. at 851.
227. Id. at 852.
228. A. RYAN, supra note 1, at 261.
229. See supra text accompanying notes 51-58.
230. Karl Linnas was born in Estonia, now part of the Soviet Union. Linnas v. INS, 790
F.2d 1024, 1026 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 600 (1986). Bohdan Koziy was from the
Ukraine, also a part of the Soviet Union. United States v. Koziy, 728 F.2d 1314, 1316 (11th
Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 835 (1984). Reinhold Kulle was born in Silesia, Poland. Kulle v.
INS, 825 F.2d 1188, 1190 (7th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 773 (1988).
231. Moeller, supra note 37, at 852. War crimes are included in the list of crimes defined
by the laws of nations. Id. at 853.
232. Id.
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It was on this basis that Israel enacted the Nazi and Nazi Collab-
orators (Punishment) Law. Israeli law criminalizes certain acts in-
cluding "crimes against the Jewish people," "crimes against
humanity," and "war crimes committed during the Nazi period. ' '233
This was the statute under which Israel charged John Demjanjuk who
was extradited to Israel from the United States. 234 Although
Demjanjuk challenged Israel's jurisdiction over him,235 the Court of
Appeals recognized Israel's extra-territorial jurisdiction over
Demjanjuk based on the universality principle. 236
Consequently, since the United States recognizes the criminal ju-
risdiction of both West Germany and Israel in these cases, more coop-
eration between our government and the governments of these two
nations in bringing Nazi war criminals to trial would help ensure that
these defendants receive a full and fair criminal trial on the merits.
B. International Criminal Court
The first International Penal Court was implemented by the Al-
lies after World War II. The Allies established the International Mili-
tary Tribunal which was responsible "for the just and prompt trial
and punishment of the major war criminals of the European Axis.
'237
This court's first cases were the Nuremburg Trials. 238 As these trials
of major Nazi war criminals ended, the Allies considered the need for
other trials against Nazi war criminals.2 a9
The Soviets and French seemed to be in favor of further trials
which were contemplated by the Charter of the Tribunal.240 The Brit-
ish, however, were not so eager.241 They wanted the trials to take
place only in British military courts.242 A compromise allowed each
country within its zone of occupation in Germany to set up appropri-
233. Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky, 776 F.2d 571, 578 (6th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S.
1016 (1986).
234. Id.
235. Id. at 579.
236. Id. at 582-83. After Demjanjuk's extradition to Israel, he was tried, convicted and
sentenced to death for war crimes. Los Angeles Times, Apr. 26, 1988, § 1, at 1, col. 3.
237. Charter of the International Military Tribunal, Aug. 8, 1945, 59 Stat. 1546, E.A.S.
472, art. 1.
238. See supra text accompanying notes 39-40.
239. 1 B. FERENCZ, AN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A STEP TOWARD WORLD
PEACE 74 (1980) [hereinafter 1 B. FERENCZ].
240. Id.
241. Id. at 74-75.
242. Id. at 75.
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ate tribunals to bring war criminals to trial. 243 And thus the first in-
ternational criminal court, the Nuremburg Tribunal, was dissolved. 244
Nuremburg gave the world hope that in the future major crimes
against humanity would not go unpunished. However, after World
War II, the nations that formed the Anti-Hitler bloc during the war
and early post-war years turned against each other as the cold war
manifested itself in international relations, including the establish-
ment of an international criminal court.245
Some thirty years later the First International Criminal Law
Conference convened in 1971 to work on the establishment of an in-
ternational criminal court.24 This convention proposed a draft con-
vention on international crimes 247 and a draft statute for an
international criminal court. 248 The first thing the draft convention
set out to do is define what crimes individuals could be punished for
under the convention. The provisions significant to the cases of Nazi
war criminals are:
1. Crimes against peace as they are defined in Article 6(a) of the
Charter of the International Military Tribunal for the Trial of the
Major War Criminals of 8 August 1945.249
2. War crimes as they are defined in Article 1(a) of the Conven-
tion on the Non-Application of Statutory Limitations to War
Criminals and Crimes Against Humanity of 26 November 1968.250
3. Genocide and other crimes against humanity as they are de-
fined in Article 1(b) of the Convention on the Non-Applicability of
Statutory Limitation to War Crimes and Crimes Against Human-
243. Id.
244. Id. at 90.
245. 2 B. FERENCZ, AN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A STEP TOWARD WORLD
PEACE 29 (1980) [hereinafter 2 B. FERENCZ]. The Soviet Union, for example, was opposed to
an international criminal court because it was seen as an infringement of a states' sovereignty.
Id. at 28. On the other hand, many other countries including France, Israel and the Nether-
lands lent their support to an international criminal court. Id. at 37.
246. FOUNDATION FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
COURT, THE FIRST INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW CONFERENCE (1971) [hereinafter IN-
TERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW CONFERENCE].
247. Id. at 8-12.
248. Id. at 13-23.
249. Id. at 9. These are crimes against peace including planning, preparation and waging
a war of aggression or a war in violation of international treaties or participating in a conspir-
acy for the accomplishment of any of the foregoing. Charter of the International Military
Tribunal, Aug. 8, 1945, 59 Stat. 1546, E.A.S. 472, art. 6(a).
250. INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW CONFERENCE, supra note 246 at 9. These crimes
include murder, ill-treatment or deportation to slave labor or for any other purpose of civilian
population of or in occupied territory and wanton destruction of cities, towns or villages not
justified by military necessity. Id. at 23.
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ity of 26 November 1968,251 and in the Convention on the Preven-
tion and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide of 9 December
1948.252
The draft convention then gave each party to it three choices
with respect to how to deal with suspected violators of these crimes.
They could try and punish any person within the country's jurisdic-
tion who was accused of committing one of these international
crimes. 253 They could extradite the suspect to a state that had juris-
diction to try him.25 4 Or, they could surrender the individual to the
international criminal court. 255 The establishment of an international
criminal court similar to the one proposed by this conference could
answer many of the constitutional questions raised by these defend-
ants. For example, their cases could be tried on the merits, before a
jury, with the proper burden of proof. The creation of such a court,
while it does not solve all the constitutional problems raised in prior
cases, would be an important step toward a full and fair trial on the
merits for these suspected war criminals.
VI. CONCLUSION
The courts have unequivocally concluded that the denaturaliza-
tion and deportation cases against suspected Nazi war criminals are
not in violation of their constitutional rights. In evaluating these
cases, however, courts in the future need to pay more attention to the
burdens imposed on these defendants, especially after deportation.
This controversy presents an enormous legal and moral dilemma. On
one side are the Nazi war criminals who are deported to a country
where they will face certain punishment, maybe even death. On the
other side, these defendants have defended themselves through the
United States court system where the government's proof must be one
of clear, unequivocal and convincing evidence256 that they illegally
obtained their United States citizenship.
The absence of a more appropriate United States response is in-
251. Id. at 9. Some of the crimes included in this provision are murder, extermination,
enslavement and other inhumane acts committed against a civil population before or during
World War II. Id. at 23.
252. Id. at 9. These crimes were acts committed with intent to destroy a national, ethnic,
racial or religious group. Id. at 23.
253. Id. at 9.
254. Id. at 9-10.
255. Id. at 10.
256. Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U.S. 118, 125 (1945).
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evitably caused by the unavailability of either an international tribu-
nal to administer international law or a greater degree of international
cooperation in this area. Since the United States does not have crimi-
nal jurisdiction over Nazi war criminals, the best it can do is denatu-
ralize and deport them for immigration violations. Consequently,
there is a greater need for international cooperation and extradition of
these suspected war criminals by countries that do have the jurisdic-
tion to try them, such as the Federal Republic of Germany.
Moreover, the 1980's have brought about a defrosting of the cold
war between the super-powers, as evidenced by the recent nuclear
arms treaty signed by the United States and the Soviet Union. The
time may be ripe now to consider ratifying the drafts for an interna-
tional criminal court proposed in 1971. It is this type of international
cooperation which can most faithfully serve the ends of justice.
Norine M. Winicki

